new side-channel attack abuses the Hyper-Threading feature of Intel chips and can extract signing keys with near-perfect accuracy. New attack TLBleed, takes advantage of the translation lookaside buffer cache of Intel chips. If exploited, TLBleed can allow an attacker to extract the secret 256-bit key used to sign programs, with a success rate of 99.8% on Intel Skylake and Coffee Lake processors and 98.2% accuracy on Broadwell Xeon chips.
TLBleed is a new side-channel in that it shows that (a) cache side-channel protection isn’t enough: TLB still leaks information; (b) side-channel safe code that is constant only in the control flow and time but not data flow is unsafe; (c) coarse-grained access patterns leak more than was previously thought.
— source searchsecurity.techtarget.com
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